Negative investment in China : financing constraints and restructuring versus growth. by Ding, Sai et al.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
07 December 2012
Version of attached file:
Published Version
Peer-review status of attached file:
Not peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Ding, Sai and Guariglia, Alessandra and Knight, John (2010) ’Negative investment in China : financing
constraints and restructuring versus growth.’, Working Paper. Durham University, Durham.
Further information on publisher’s website:
http://www.dur.ac.uk/business/faculty/working-papers/
Publisher’s copyright statement:
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 — Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
1 
 
Negative investment in China: financing constraints and restructuring 
versus growth 
 
Sai Ding
+*
 
 
(University of Glasgow) 
 
Alessandra Guariglia 
(Durham University) 
  
and 
John Knight 
(University of Oxford) 
 
Abstract 
This paper attempts to address a puzzle in China’s investment pattern: despite high aggregate 
investment and remarkable economic growth, negative net investment is commonly found at the 
microeconomic level. Using a large firm-level dataset, we test three hypotheses to explain the 
existence and extent of negative investment in each ownership group: what we term the efficiency (or 
restructuring) hypothesis, the (lack of) financing hypothesis, and the (slow) growth hypothesis. Our 
panel data probit estimations shows that negative investment by state-owned firms can be explained 
mainly by inefficiency: owing to over-investment or mis-investment in the past, these firms have had 
to restructure and to get rid of obsolete capital in the face of increasing competition and hardening 
budgets. The financing explanation holds for private firms, which have had to divest in order to raise 
capital. However, rapid economic growth weighs against both effects in all types of firms, with a 
larger impact for firms in the private and foreign sectors. A tobit model, estimated to examine the 
determinants of the amount of negative investment, yields similar conclusions.  
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1. Introduction 
China’s investment rate during the last three decades has been remarkably high. Gross capital 
formation has averaged a fairly steady 39 percent of GDP over the entire reform period, the 
fixed capital formation component of which has risen, from an average of 29 percent between 
1978 and 1992 to an average of 37 percent between 1993 and 2009
1
. The high investment 
rate and dramatic investment-generated improvements in productivity and technology have 
been viewed as the main driving forces behind China’s remarkable growth over the reform 
period. Investment accounts for about two-thirds of the growth differences between China 
and Sub-Saharan Africa (Ding and Knight, 2009). It appears that high investment has been a 
necessary condition for China’s remarkable growth success.  
Nevertheless, China also has much negative net investment. Our comprehensive 
nationwide annual dataset of about 100,000 Chinese manufacturing firms covering the period 
2000-07 shows that, on the one hand, annual net investment averaged 22% of value added 
and 10% of fixed capital stock but, on the other hand, 31% of the firm-year observations in 
the sample actually divested! The combination of high investment for firms in aggregate and 
divestment among individual firms presents a puzzle which, to our knowledge, has been 
ignored in the literature. In this paper we attempt to solve it. 
China is not alone in having a high rate of negative investment. Using firm-level data 
from Amadeus (Bureau Van Dijk) and the same variable definition, we observe extensive 
divestment among many transition economies over similar time periods: 9% in Poland, 9% in 
the Czech Republic, 13% in Bulgaria, and 33% in Romania. Much negative investment can 
also be observed in the UK FAME dataset (Bureau Van Dijk), according to which 22% of 
firm-year observations are characterized by negative net investment. The phenomenon 
deserves to be understood, particularly in the case of China. On the one hand, China's fast 
economic growth should reduce the frequency of negative investment below that of slower-
growing economies. On the other hand, the transitional and marketizing status of the Chinese 
economy should raise the frequency above that of market economies. 
Using the firm-level dataset referred to above, we attempt to provide answers to two 
broad research questions. First, why do Chinese firms divest, i.e., what variables determine 
the probability of negative net investment? Second, why do some firms divest more than 
others, i.e., what are the determinants of the amount of negative investment among divesting 
firms? To answer these questions, probit and tobit models are respectively estimated. We find 
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that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) divest mainly for inefficiency or restructuring reasons, 
e.g., they need to eliminate obsolete capital in the face of rising competition or other 
pressures to become efficient. Negative investment by private firms is mainly due to external 
financial constraints, e.g., they need to obtain funds before investing in new opportunities. 
The fact that firms are growing fast offsets both of these incentives for negative investment, 
particularly so in the case of the - most dynamic - private and foreign firms. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the 
relevant theories and empirical evidence on negative investment. Section 3 specifies and 
explains the hypotheses that we test against the background of China’s institutional reform. 
Section 4 describes the data and sample, with a focus on the ownership definitions. Section 5 
sets out our baseline specifications and empirical methodology. Section 6 reports the 
descriptive statistics and interprets the estimation results of both the probit and tobit models. 
Section 7 provides a number of robustness tests for each hypothesis. Section 8 draws 
conclusions. 
2. Literature review 
Compared with the enormous literature on positive investment by firms, the topic of negative 
investment (or divestment) is under-researched. Moreover, the negative investment literature 
focuses largely on developed countries characterized by mature financial markets. According 
to Gadad et al. (2004), divestment can take many forms: sell-off, spin-off, equity carve-out, 
and management buyout
2
. Given that most firms in our sample are not listed in the stock 
market, our survey focuses on the first form of divestment, the sell-off.  
The finance literature has identified several reasons for negative investment, among 
which the following five are most prominent: the efficiency explanation, whereby assets are 
transferred to firms which can operate them more productively; the focus explanation, 
according to which divestment may permit concentration on core activities; the financing 
explanation, whereby divestment can raise capital without recourse to the capital market; the 
liquidity explanation, which stresses the need for assets to be liquid if divestment is to occur; 
and the defensive restructuring explanation, according to which asset divestment is a 
response to rapid economic transition. This explanation may well be intertwined with the 
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 A sell-off occurs when a firm sells a part of its assets to another firm. A spin-off takes place when ownership 
of the divested asset is transferred to a new company formed by a pro-rata distribution of equity shares in the 
new company to current shareholders. An equity carve-out occurs when ownership of the divested assets is 
transferred to a new company formed by the issue of equity shares in the new company to the public. A 
management buyout means that the incumbent management team buys all the equity shares of either a firm or a 
subsidiary from current shareholders. 
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efficiency explanation. Each of these hypotheses is potentially important for understanding 
the coexistence of widespread negative investment and huge positive investment among 
Chinese firms. 
2.1 The efficiency explanation 
Hite et al. (1987) argue that managers retain only assets for which they have a comparative 
advantage, and that they sell assets if another party can manage them more efficiently. 
Investigating cases for both partial or total sell-offs in the US
3
, they find that asset sales are 
associated with the movement of resources to higher-valued uses and that sellers capture 
some of the resulting gains. 
Using a US firm-level database, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) analyze the market 
for corporate assets (plants, divisions, and whole firms) in manufacturing industries and 
examine how seller characteristics and firm organization influence asset sales. They find that 
assets are more likely to be sold when they are less productive than their industry benchmarks, 
when the selling division is less productive, when the selling firm has more productive 
divisions in other industries, and when the economy is undergoing positive demand shocks. 
The timing of sales and the pattern of efficiency gains suggest that divestments tend to 
improve the allocation of resources. 
Warusawitharana (2008) presents a model in which asset sales and purchases enable 
the transfer of capital from less to more productive firms. His empirical analysis concludes 
that both return on assets and firm size influence asset transactions, i.e., more profitable firms 
purchase assets whereas less profitable firms choose to downsize and sell assets, and large 
firms engage more than small firms in asset transactions. 
2.2 The focus explanation 
John and Ofek (1995) emphasize focus as a motive for divestment: selling an unrelated asset 
leads to an increase in focus and to more efficient operation of the core business. The 
improvement in performance may have various causes, including elimination of negative 
synergies and better allocation of management time and other resources. Using a US sample, 
they find that asset sales improve the performance of the remaining assets in each of the three 
years following the asset sale, but only if the firm increases focus. The results support their 
hypothesis that divestments are undertaken to achieve a more focused operation. 
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 A partial sell-off is the sale of a subsidiary, division, or other operating assets; a total sell-off (or liquidation) 
occurs when a firm sells all its assets.  
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Berger and Ofek (1995) adopt segment-level US data to estimate the valuation effect 
of diversification and to examine the potential sources of value gains or losses. They find that 
the value of diversified firms is on average about 14% lower than the sum of the imputed 
values of their segments, implying that diversification reduces value. Overinvestment is 
associated with diversification, and segments of diversified firms overinvest more than 
single-line firms
4
.  
2.3 The financing explanation 
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) link asset sales to the firm’s debt capacity. They argue that selling 
assets can be more attractive and cheaper than debt rescheduling and issuing new securities as 
a way of raising funds to meet debt obligations. Asset sales can lessen conflicts between 
creditors, control agency costs, and alleviate the problem of informational asymmetry 
between the firm and outsiders. However, the process may be hindered if assets are illiquid.  
Lang et al. (1995) argue that managers may sell assets to obtain funds when 
alternative funding is either more expensive or unavailable. Highly-leveraged or poorly-
performing firms may find it expensive to use the capital markets owing to adverse selection 
costs (Myers and Majluf, 1984) or agency costs of managerial discretion (Jensen, 1988; Stulz, 
1990). Based on a sample of US asset sales, Lang et al. (1995) find that firms selling assets 
are characterized by high leverage or poor performance. The typical firm selling assets 
appears to be motivated by its financial situation rather than by its comparative advantage.  
Hovakimian and Titman (2006) examine the relationship between proceeds from 
voluntary asset sales and investment expenditure, using a US dataset. Their regressions show 
that cash obtained from asset sales is a significant determinant of corporate investment and 
that the sensitivity of investment to proceeds from asset sales is significantly stronger for 
firms that are likely to be financially constrained. Thus, funds from voluntary divestment 
provide an important financing source for financially constrained firms. 
2.4 The liquidity explanation 
Schlingemann et al. (2002) emphasize the role of asset liquidity in determining which asset is 
divested in the pursuit of firm objectives. They argue that more liquid assets are more likely 
to be divested. They control for the factors that initiate the divestment process by examining 
only focusing firms, i.e., firms cutting out segments. The probability that a segment is 
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divested is found to be higher if the asset is in an industry with a liquid market for assets. 
Their empirical finding is in line with the theoretical prediction of Shleifer and Vishny (1992) 
that asset illiquidity impedes asset sales and worsens financial distress of firms.  
2.5 The defensive restructuring explanation 
Negative net investment can arise for different reasons in transition economies. Asset 
divestment can be forced on a firm when its survival is threatened. According to Carlin et al. 
(2001), divestment may indicate restructuring and downsizing by firms that have difficulties 
in adapting to a new market environment. Using a World Bank survey covering 25 transition 
countries, they examine the determinants of firm restructuring and performance. They find 
that SOEs and old firms are significantly more likely to engage in defensive restructuring 
through labour shedding and plant closures, and that firms with market power are less likely 
to do so.  
This defensive restructuring argument is closely linked to the financing explanation 
for divestment proposed by Filatotchev et al. (2007). Using a survey of large private 
Hungarian and Polish companies, they investigate managers’ choice of financing sources. 
Hypothesizing that divestment may be a means of raising funds if firms become financially 
distressed during economic transition, they find a negative relationship between divestment 
and bank finance. Their interpretation is that if firms are undergoing restructuring and 
seeking access to fresh finance, funders may view divestment as a negative signal and thus a 
deterrent to lending. 
In summary, the literature provides various motivations for firms to divest. Asset sales 
enable financially healthy firms to restructure and to improve efficiency by selling assets to 
more productive users or by selling assets unrelated to the core business. Asset sales may 
permit financially constrained firms to raise capital if debt and equity markets are unattractive 
or unavailable. Asset liquidity plays a role in determining which assets are divested. In 
transition economies, asset divestment may assist defensive restructuring or relieve financial 
distress. 
3. Development of hypotheses 
Our hypotheses must take into account the Chinese context. China had a centrally planned 
economy until economic reform began in 1978. The reform process has been described by 
Deng Xiaoping as ‘crossing the river by groping for the stones’. The reforms were 
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incremental but hardly slow: huge changes have occurred in only three decades, as China has 
moved towards a market economy. 
A distinguishing feature of China's institutional reform is the emergence of new forms 
of ownership. The Chinese industrial sector was initially dominated by SOEs, whose 
directive was to fulfil production quotas, to transfer profits to government, and to provide 
life-long employment. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the collectively-owned 'township and 
village enterprise' (TVE) sector grew rapidly and played a catalytic role in pushing China 
towards a market economy. Several factors contributed to the rapid development of TVEs, 
including planning restrictions on SOEs which created 'missing markets', their competitive 
advantage derived from low wages, and local government revenue incentives. Unlike SOEs, 
TVEs faced relatively hard budget constraints, so generating profit incentives. The entry of 
TVEs also provided competition for SOEs. However, when restrictions on the private sector 
were gradually relaxed and when the urban reforms created more incentives for SOEs to seek 
out profitable opportunities and to compete successfully against them, TVEs began to lose 
their ground; after the mid-1990s many were transformed into private businesses.    
Deng Xiaoping's ‘southern tour’ of 1992 formally gave the green light to capitalist 
development. The Company Law adopted in 1994 provided a uniform legal framework into 
which all of the ownership forms fit, signalling the introduction of more clearly defined 
property rights and the start of the dramatic institutional change involved in the rapid 
downsizing of the state sector. Many SOEs and urban collective enterprises (UCEs) were shut 
down, and employment in SOEs and UCEs shrank by over 40 percent and 75 percent 
respectively between 1995 and 2006
5
. A large number of SOEs and UCEs were either 
privatized or turned into shareholding entities that are increasingly dominated by private 
owners (Lin and Zhu, 2001; Garnaut et al., 2005). However, SOEs remain dominant in 
energy, natural resources and a few strategic or monopolistic sectors that are controlled and 
protected by central and local governments.  
Figure 1 shows the shares of different ownership categories in investment in fixed 
assets over the period of 1980-2008. SOEs accounted for the bulk of fixed investment until 
the early 1990s, after which the structure of investment altered dramatically. Between 1992 
and 2008, the investment share of SOEs fell from two-thirds to one-third, whereas the share 
of private enterprises climbed to two-thirds. This has been viewed as a positive development, 
given that the average return on capital in SOEs was well below that in the private sector and 
many SOEs continued to make losses (Dougherty and Herd, 2005; Knight and Ding, 2010).  
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There is evidence that the profitability of the state sector improved after 1998: the 
measures taken from the mid-1990s onwards to make SOEs more accountable for their 
profits and losses seem to have been effective (Lu et al., 2008; Knight and Ding, 2010). The 
SOEs that survived the massive downsizing and reform are assumed to be more efficient and 
profitable on average. Our comprehensive firm-level dataset, spanning the years from 2000 to 
2007, provides an opportunity to test this argument. Our first hypothesis is that there are 
firms - SOEs in particular - which divest for efficiency reasons, i.e., some firms, being less 
efficient than others, choose to divest and downsize. 
China's inefficient and 'repressed' financial system may cause firms ownership by 
different agents to behave differently. Government has intervened, and continues to intervene, 
in bank lending to favour the state sector (Riedel et al., 2007). Despite the gradual reform of 
the banking sector, bank loans constitute a major share of investment financing only for the 
SOEs, while private firms are generally discriminated against by the formal financial system 
and have to rely predominantly on internal funds for investment (Allen et al., 2005; Guariglia 
et al., forthcoming; Knight and Ding, 2010). Although these problems have become less 
severe since 2000 (Guariglia and Poncet, 2008), private investment has remained constrained 
(Haggard and Huang, 2008). Our second hypothesis is that there are firms - especially private 
firms - which divest in order to generate the funds required to pursue their objectives when 
other sources of finance are limited or costly.      
A distinguishing feature of the Chinese economy is its rapid growth: the growth rate 
of GDP per capita averaged 8.6% per annum over the three decades of economic reform. 
Moreover, the growth of real sales in our sample averaged 11.6% per annum over the period 
2000-07. This remarkable growth performance creates vast opportunities for investment. In 
the investment literature, Blomström et al. (1996) argue that growth induces subsequent 
capital formation more than capital formation induces subsequent growth. Thus our third 
hypothesis is that the growth of firms reduces both the probability of divestment and, if it 
occurs at all, the amount of divestment. The role of firm growth has not been explored in the 
literature on negative investment.  
In summary, to understand why Chinese firms divest, we investigate how firm 
efficiency, financing, and growth influence negative investment in each ownership group. 
Our lack of segment-level data prevents a testing of the focus and liquidity hypotheses.  
4. Data and sample 
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Firm-level data offer several advantages for the study of investment or divestment behaviour: 
the problem of aggregation over firms is eliminated in estimation, and the heterogeneity 
among various types of firms can be taken into account (Bond and Van Reenen, 2007). This 
is particularly important for China owing to the institutional differences between state and 
non-state enterprises. 
We use data drawn from the annual accounting reports filed with the National Bureau 
of Statistics (NBS) by industrial firms over the period of 2000-07. The original sample 
contains more than 532,000 firms, including all SOEs and other types of enterprises with 
annual sales of five million yuan (about $650,000) or more. These firms operate in the 
manufacturing and mining sectors and in 31 provinces or province-equivalent municipal 
cities. We deleted observations with negative sales; as well as observations with negative 
total assets minus total fixed assets; total assets minus liquid assets; and accumulated 
depreciation minus current depreciation. Firms that lacked complete records on our main 
regression variables were also dropped. To control for the potential influence of outliers, we 
excluded observations in the one percent tails of each of the regression variables. Finally, we 
removed all firms with fewer than five years of consecutive observations. 
Our final dataset covers 100,112 (mainly unlisted) firms, which yield 639,382 firm-
year observations
6
. The sample is unbalanced: the structure of the panel can be seen in Table 
A1 in Appendix 1. The number of observations ranges from a minimum of 49,639 in 2000 to 
a maximum of 93,330 in 2003. Entry and exit of firms take place during our sample period: 
fewer than 30 percent of firms have the full 8-year accounting information. The active entry 
and exit of firms are the consequence of the enterprise restructuring that began in the mid-
1990s, and can be viewed as a source of dynamism (see, for instance, Brandt et al., 2009).  
The NBS data contain a continuous measure of ownership, which is based on the 
fraction of paid-in-capital contributed by six different types of investors: the state; foreign 
investors (excluding those from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan); investors from Hong 
Kong, Macao, and Taiwan; legal entities; individuals; and collective investors. The rationale 
for dividing foreign investors into those from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, and those 
from other parts of the world is that the former capture the so-called ‘round-tripping’ foreign 
direct investment, whereby domestic firms may register as foreign invested firms from 
nearby regions to take advantage of the benefits (such as tax and legal benefits) granted to 
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 The NBS dataset does not allow separate identification of publicly listed companies. It is difficult to track 
these companies as their legal identification numbers were changed as they went public (Liu and Xiao, 2004). 
Over the period considered, there were slightly more than 1,000 listed companies operating in the manufacturing 
and mining sectors. This amounts to less than 0.3% of the total number of firms in our sample. 
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foreign invested firms (Huang, 2003). Ownership by legal entities, being a mixture of 
ownership by state legal entities and private legal entities
7
, represents a form of corporate 
ownership. Collective firms are typically owned collectively by communities in rural areas 
(TVEs) or urban area (UCEs).  
We group all foreign firms (from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and other parts of the 
world) into a single category (which are labelled foreign); and all firms owned by legal 
entities and individuals into a single category (labelled private)
8
. Thus our firms fall into four 
broad categories - state-owned, collective, private and foreign - based on the shares of paid-
in-capital contributed by our four types of investors in each year.  
We adopt two methods of classifying firms by ownership. First, we group firms 
according to the majority average ownership shares. For instance, if the average share of 
paid-in-capital owned by private investors over the period 2000-07 exceeds 50%, then the 
firm is classified as privately owned. A potential problem with this method is that the size of 
private ownership is likely to be exaggerated. According to Haggard and Huang (2008), 
genuinely private domestic firms are different from government-controlled firms. They argue 
that the former group has remained relatively small and subject to many controls and 
permissions, for instance with regard to the provision of finance and the requirement of 
official approval of investment projects above a certain size. To take this phenomenon into 
account, our second approach to classification is based on a 100% rule. In this case, a firm is 
classified, for instance, as privately-owned when all its paid-in-capital in every year is 
contributed by private investors. This method allows us to focus on the firms which are likely 
to represent the genuine private sector. The cost of this second approach is that many firms 
are left in a residual category, which is referred to as the mixed ownership group.  
Table A2 in Appendix 1 reports the distribution of observations by ownership using 
both methods. Our sample is dominated by private firms, i.e., 62% firms are classified as 
privately-owned by the majority classification rule and 38% by the 100% rule. SOEs, 
collective firms and foreign firms represent 8%, 8% and 18% of our sample respectively 
using the majority rule, and 4%, 3% and 10% respectively using the 100% rule. The second 
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 Legal entities represent a mix of various domestic institutions, such as industrial enterprises, construction and 
real estate development companies, transportation and power companies, security companies, trust and 
investment companies, foundations and funds, banks, technology and research institutions etc. 
8
 Within this category, firms owned by individuals represent about two thirds of the total. As firms owned by 
legal entities include firms owned by state legal entities, one could question their inclusion in the private 
category. One reason for including them is that while the state’s primary interests is partly political (i.e. aimed at 
maintaining employment levels or control over certain strategic industries), legal entities are profit-oriented 
(Wei et al., 2005). Since our dataset does not allow us to discriminate between state and non-state legal persons, 
we are unable to exclude the former from our private category. However, our results are robust to excluding all 
firms owned by legal entities from the private category.   
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approach decreases the number of firms in all four types of ownership groups, and enlarges 
the mixed ownership group: 46% of our observations are classified as mixed ownership. 
Because the composition of investors in this residual group is unclear, the second method of 
ownership classification involves a significant loss of useful observations despite its 
potentially more accurate measure of private ownership. We therefore rely mainly on the 
majority classification rule to divide firms into different ownership groups, and use the 100% 
rule as a robustness check. 
Table A2 in Appendix 1 shows an interesting pattern in the evolution of ownership 
over the period 2000-07. Based on the majority classification rule, we see that the proportion 
of SOEs in our sample declined dramatically from 12% in 2000 to 5% in 2007. A similar 
pattern holds for collective firms, whose share declined from 11% in 2000 to 7% in 2007. In 
contrast, the share of private firms rose from 52% to 66%, and that of foreign firms remained 
stable at 17-19%. Privatization of small SOEs and TVEs became significant after 1998 
(Haggard and Huang, 2008), and our data reflect this restructuring process. 
5. Baseline specification and estimation methodology 
5.1 Baseline specification 
We start by estimating the following regression 
                                                                                 
                                                                 
                 ,                                                                                (1) 
where the dependent variable is a variable representing divestment. Unlike other studies in 
the literature, our dataset does not have any information on asset sales. We therefore define 
net investment as real tangible fixed assets in period t minus real tangible fixed assets in 
period t-1, net of depreciation, i.e.,                , where   is the reported 
depreciation rate and    is the real value of tangible fixed assets in period t
9
. Negative 
investment or divestment occurs when     .  
When testing for the probability of negative investment, the dependent variable is a 
binary variable taking value of one if the firm divests, and zero otherwise. When examining 
the determinants of the amount of negative investment, the dependent variable is a censored 
variable which is equal to zero if the firm does not divest, and takes the value of the actual 
amount of divestment otherwise. 
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The independent variables in equation (1) include proxies aimed at testing the 
financing, efficiency, and growth hypotheses, as well as some conditioning variables. 
               is the lagged cash flow to tangible fixed assets ratio, where cash flow is 
defined as the sum of net income and depreciation. Models of capital market imperfection 
imply that external financing is more costly than internal financing (for instance, Myers, 1984; 
Hubbard, 1998). For given levels of investment opportunities, information costs, and market 
interest rates, firms with higher net worth should invest more, and therefore have a lower 
probability, or lower amount, of negative investment. We hypothesize a negative coefficient 
on the cash flow term in the divestment equations.  
Cash flow, however, is an imperfect proxy for changes in net worth, as it might also 
contain information about expected future profitability or, more in general, demand factors, 
which may be relevant to investment decisions even in the absence of capital market 
imperfections. This is especially the case when investment opportunities are omitted or mis-
measured by standard measures such as Tobin’s Q (Bond et al., 2003; Carpenter and 
Guariglia, 2008). Thus the finding of a significant coefficient on cash flow cannot be 
interpreted as necessarily indicating financial constraints (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; 2000). 
To deal with this problem, we adopt a method proposed by Brown and Peterson (2009), 
according to which interactions of time dummies and industry dummies are used to capture 
investment opportunities or, more specifically, time-varying demand shocks at the industry 
level. This method has been widely used in recent literature (see, for instance, Brown et al, 
2009; Duchin et al., 2010; and Guariglia et al., forthcoming)
10
. 
The second financial variable,              , is the lagged ratio of total debt over 
total assets, and can be seen as a measure of the amount of external finance used by the firm. 
Leverage can affect investment in a number of ways. High leverage can impair a firm’s 
ability to raise additional capital and reduce the amount of cash that is available for 
investment. According to Myers (1977), managers of highly leveraged firms may be induced 
to forgo positive net present value (NPV) projects because some or all of the benefits from 
the investment may accrue to debt-holders. Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) argue that high 
leverage in low-growth firms discourages management from undertaking unprofitable 
investments. These theories predict a negative relationship between leverage and investment. 
Consequently, the probability or amount of negative investment may rise with a higher 
leverage ratio. On the other hand, high leverage might also be interpreted as indicating high 
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debt capacity or low external financial constraints (Hovakimian, 2009). In these 
circumstances, there may be a positive relationship between leverage and investment, and 
thus the probability, or the amount, of negative investment may decrease as leverage 
increases.  
Most empirical literature supports the former view. For instance, using US or 
Canadian data, Lang et al. (1996), Aivazian et al. (2005) and Ahn et al. (2006) all report a 
negative relation between investment and leverage and that the correlation is much stronger 
for firms with low growth. Firth et al. (2008) obtain a negative relationship between leverage 
and investment among listed firms in China, and find that the connection is weaker in firms 
with low growth opportunities, poor operating performance, and high level of state 
shareholding. They claim that this is consistent with the hypothesis that state-owned banks in 
China impose fewer restrictions on the capital expenditures of low growth and poorly 
performing firms, as well as firms with greater state ownership. We expect the relationship 
between leverage and divestment to be positive for SOEs as a result of their soft budget 
constraints, but negative for private firms which have limited access to formal bank credit 
and may have to divest for financing purpose. 
The third financial variable,                , is a measure of asset tangibility, defined 
as the lagged ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets. Collateral can be important in 
raising funds in the presence of incentive problems and asymmetric information between the 
firm and the capital market (Wette, 1983). Firms with lower tangibility of assets are more 
likely to have difficulties in borrowing and thus to have to cut back on investment. On the 
other hand, Hovakimian (2009) argues that firms with low asset tangibility are more likely to 
operate in industries with high growth, and could therefore display higher investment. We 
therefore keep an open mind about the sign of the coefficient associated with collateral. 
To test the efficiency hypothesis, we compute the firm-level total factor productivity 
(        ) using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method, which is described in Appendix 2. 
Similar to the three financing variables, we lag our TFP measure once to alleviate the 
potential endogeneity problem in the divestment regressions. We predict a negative 
relationship between firm-level TFP and divestment based on the efficiency explanation. We 
also expect the effect to be greatest for the SOEs, which are much less efficient than other 
non-state firms. 
The lagged growth rates of real sales,                  , a proxy for output growth 
of the firm, is used to test for the growth hypothesis of divestment. We hypothesize a 
negative relationship between sales growth and negative investment. We also expect the 
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effect to be greater for non-state firms than for SOEs given the widespread evidence that the 
former are much more dynamic than the latter.  
As for the control variables, we include firm size, firm age and an export dummy in 
our baseline model.                is defined as the lagged value of the natural logarithm of 
real total assets. It can be important in explaining financing choices for corporate investment. 
According to Myers and Majluf (1984), size may serve as an inverse proxy for the extent of 
informational asymmetries between the firm’s insiders and external finance providers: 
smaller firms are expected to face higher hurdles when raising external capital, whereas large 
firms, which are assumed to be more diversified and less prone to bankruptcy, can borrow 
more easily. We hypothesize that firm size does not play an important role in SOEs’ 
divestment decisions owing to their soft budget constraints, but might be important for non-
state firms.  
Firm age may also serve as a proxy for the wedge between the costs of external and 
internal capital (Oliner and Rudebusch, 1992). On the one hand, younger firms are more 
likely to face problems of asymmetric information and may therefore be more financially 
constrained compared to their older counterparts. On the other hand, younger firms are 
generally more dynamic and efficient than old ones. In the Chinese context, old firms may be 
less efficient and more likely to divest for restructuring reasons, whereas younger firms may 
be more likely to divest for funding reasons. 
We use an export dummy to capture the expected performance-enhancing efforts of 
export activities among Chinese firms. We hypothesize that firms conducting export business 
are more likely not to divest or to divest less. This is consistent with widespread evidence that 
efficiency and exports are positively correlated in China (Kraay, 1999; Park et al., 
forthcoming).  
Lastly, we include time dummies (  ) to account for macroeconomic fluctuations or 
business cycle effects, industry dummies (  ) to capture industry-specific effects, and the 
interactions of time and industry dummies (   ) to account for industry-specific shifts in 
investment demand or expectations.  
5.2 Estimation methodology 
We first estimate a random-effects probit model to examine the factors that determine the 
probability of negative investment for each ownership group. We then use a random-effects 
tobit model to estimate the determinants of the amount of negative investment in the 
divesting firms.  
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To control for the potential endogeneity of our regressors, all variables except firm 
age and dummies are lagged once in our regression, the aim being to alleviate simultaneity 
bias. As a robustness test, we also estimate our equations using an Instrumental Variable (IV) 
approach. 
6. Empirical results 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for some key variables. Fixed asset investment as a 
proportion of tangible fixed assets averages 9.5% in our sample. The rate is lowest for SOEs 
(4.2%) and highest for private firms (10.7%), followed by foreign firms (9.9%). The 
proportion of firms that have negative fixed asset investment is 31.4% for the full sample: it 
is highest for SOEs (40.7%) and lowest for foreign firms (29.1%) and private firms (30.3%). 
Negative investment is a widespread phenomenon in all types of firms in China. The high 
proportion in the case of SOEs suggests that there may be dramatic structural changes in this 
sector. 
Turning to the three financial variables included in our baseline model: SOEs have the 
lowest cash flow ratio (14.1%), and the highest leverage (63.2%) and asset tangibility ratios 
(41.5%). In contrast, foreign firms have the lowest leverage (48.5%) and asset tangibility 
ratios (32.3%). The ratios of private firms lie between those of SOEs and foreign firms. 
Collective firms have the highest cash flow (41.5%). The co-existence of high leverage and 
low cash flow in the state sector is initial evidence of the easy credit and soft budget 
constraints enjoyed by SOEs. The descriptive statistics for collective firms are consistent with 
Naughton’s (2007) view that, after reform and transformation, these firms operate effectively 
as private enterprises.  
SOEs have the lowest TFP and foreign firms the highest, followed by private firms 
and then collective firms. It is apparent that SOEs remain the least efficient. SOEs also have 
the lowest rate of sales growth (6.0%), whereas private firms have the highest rate (13.1%). 
Foreign firms also have a high growth rate (11.2%). The growth rate of collective firms 
(8.3%) is higher than SOEs’ but lower than that of private and foreign firms. Thus private and 
foreign firms are the faster growing groups, whereas SOEs are, relatively speaking, 
stagnating. 
SOEs are generally older and larger than enterprises in the non-state sectors. 
Collective firms and SOEs are least involved in the exporting business: respectively only 14.4% 
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and 18.1% of these firms export, compared to 71.5% and 27.6%, respecively for foreign and 
private firms. 
In summary, the descriptive statistics show that over the period 2000-07, SOEs were 
the least financially healthy, the least efficient and the slowest growing. Given their easy 
access to credit, reflected in their high leverage ratio, the poor performance of SOEs reflects 
inefficiencies in capital allocation and a sluggish response to market forces. It is therefore not 
surprising to observe that SOEs had the highest negative investment rate. In contrast, private 
and foreign firms were the most profitable, efficient, and dynamic sectors. Collective firms 
had good financial performance but fewer growth opportunities. These differences make it 
plausible to hypothesize that different ownership groups divest for different reasons. In the 
sub-section that follows, we aim to test whether this is indeed the case. 
6.2 Random-effects probit results 
Table 2 reports random-effects probit estimates of our baseline model. The cash flow 
coefficient is negative and significant for all four ownership groups, which accords with the 
theoretical prediction that firms with higher net worth will divest less. The divestment rate of 
SOEs is more sensitive to the availability of internal finance than that of firms in non-state 
sectors. A unit standard deviation decrease in the cash flow ratio increases the probability of 
negative investment by 7.9% for SOEs, 3.8% for private firms, and 2.6% for foreign firms.  
The leverage ratio displays an interesting pattern across the ownership groups. The 
coefficient is significantly positive for SOEs, significantly negative for private firms, and 
insignificant for collective and foreign firms. For SOEs, the probability of negative 
investment is higher the higher the level of external borrowing: a one standard deviation 
increase in the leverage ratio is associated with an increase in the probability of divestment of 
5.2 percentage points.  Taking into account the fact that SOEs have the highest leverage ratio, 
we see the adverse effect of easy credit and soft budget constraints: excess leverage seems to 
impair SOEs' investment capability. On the contrary, private firms are more likely to divest 
the lower the leverage ratio:  the probability of having negative investment rises by 5.8 
percentage points in the presence of a unit standard deviation decrease in the leverage ratio. 
Private firms are generally discriminated against by the domestic banking system and have to 
rely on internal sources of finance such as retained earnings or asset sales to raise capital. 
These findings support the hypothesis that the financing explanation of negative investment 
holds for them, and are consistent with the recent literature on corporate finance in China 
(Haggard and Huang, 2008; Guariglia et al., forthcoming). External finance does not affect 
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the divestment decisions of collective and foreign firms, perhaps because of their links with 
local governments and international financial markets respectively. These may serve as 
alternative sources of finance for them.  
The coefficient on the collateral ratio is positive and significant for all firms: a higher 
asset tangibility ratio is associated with a higher probability of negative investment. This 
result does not support the idea that collateral plays a role in alleviating information 
asymmetries between firms and creditors and thus fostering investment. This is not surprising 
for China given its underdeveloped and repressed financial system. Rather, our data are in 
line with the view of Hovakimian (2009) that firms with lower asset tangibility are more 
likely to operate in industries with higher growth opportunities so that the probability of 
negative investment declines as asset tangibility falls.  
The firm-level TFP measure has a significantly negative coefficient for all ownership 
groups: firms are more likely to divest when they are less productive. The marginal effect is 
greatest for SOEs: a unit standard deviation increase in TFP reduces the probability of 
negative investment by 2 percentage points for SOEs, 1.4 percentage points for collective 
firms, 1.1 percentage points for private firms, and 0.6 percentage points for foreign firms. 
The efficiency argument thus provides a good explanation for the negative investment in the 
state sector: owing to over-investment or mis-investment in the past, SOEs divest in order to 
eliminate obsolete capital in the face of increasing competition and other incentives to make 
profits and avoid losses. 
The growth rate of real sales significantly reduces the probability of divestment for all 
types of firms, with the largest marginal effects for private and foreign firms: in the presence 
of a unit standard deviation increase in sales growth, the probability of negative investment 
drops by 9 and 10 percentage points respectively for these two groups of firms. This supports 
our hypothesis that firm growth protects against negative investment. In their divestment 
decisions, private and foreign firms are more responsive to growth opportunities than state 
and collective firms.  
Turning to the control variables: the coefficient on firm size is insignificant for the 
divestment decisions of SOEs and foreign firms, but it is significantly positive for collective 
and private firms. This is consistent with our prediction that their easy access to external 
finance insulates the divestment decisions of SOEs from the influences of firm size. Smaller 
collective and private firms are more likely to outperform their larger counterparts, and 
therefore are less likely to divest.  
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The coefficient of firm age is positive and significant in the divestment regression for 
all firms. In China firm age does not perform an efficient role in alleviating informational 
asymmetry, as it does in many developed financial markets. Instead, younger firms, being 
generally more dynamic and efficient, are less likely to divest.    
The export dummy is insignificant for SOEs and collective firms but significantly 
negative for private and foreign firms. The probability of negative investment declines when 
private and foreign firms have the opportunity to export. The marginal effects imply that 
exporters in the two groups have a 4-5% lower probability of divestment than non-exporters. 
This is in line with the view of Park et al. (forthcoming) that exporting is a cause of superior 
performance. 
In summary, our probit results suggest that negative investment can be mainly 
explained by inefficiency in the case of SOEs and by financial constraints in the case of 
private firms. Rapid growth of the firm counterweighs both effects for all types of firms. 
Moreover, a high probability of negative investment in the non-state sectors is associated 
with certain firm characteristics: being old, large, and lacking access to overseas markets. 
6.3 Random-effects tobit results 
For those firms which divest, what factors determine the amount of negative investment? To 
answer this question, equation (1) is estimated using a tobit model. The results are shown in 
Table 3. 
In line with the findings in the probit model, lower cash flow and higher asset 
tangibility are associated with a higher level of negative investment for all firms. The 
leverage term is significantly negative for collective and private firms, but insignificant for 
SOEs and foreign firms. The biggest effect is found for private firms: for these, a unit 
standard deviation decrease in the leverage ratio raises the amount of negative investment by 
12.6%. The finding that lower levels of external finance produce more divestment confirms 
our hypothesis that the need for funds may explain divestment by private firms. 
The coefficient of TFP is significantly negative for all firms, with the biggest effect 
for SOEs: for these firms, a unit standard deviation decrease in TFP raises the amount of 
negative investment by 1.9%. This is consistent with our prediction that inefficiency is most 
important in explaining the massive divestment in the state sector. 
The growth rate of sales also has a negative and significant coefficient for all firms: a 
higher sales growth is associated with less divestment. Bigger marginal effects are found for 
private and foreign firms: a one standard deviation rise in sales growth decreases the amount 
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of negative investment by 11.8% and 13.6% respectively for these two groups of firms. This 
suggests that the growth hypothesis holds most for the fastest-growing sectors. 
Several additional factors affect the amount of negative investment in the non-state 
firms. For instance, larger and older firms, and those which do not export, tend to have more 
negative investment. Overall the findings are consistent with our probit results. 
7. Robustness tests 
7.1 Alternative tests of the hypotheses 
To test the robustness of our results in the baseline model, we use some alternative measures 
of our main right hand side variables. We first introduce a measure of net profit to proxy 
firms’ net worth. One important component of the cash flow measure is depreciation. 
However there is no consensus as to whether depreciation is a source of funds, i.e., whether 
depreciation is a source of capital replacement or just one of the adjustments needed to 
convert the accrual net income to the cash provided from operating activities. As a robustness 
check, we deduct deprecation from cash flow, which gives a measure of net profit. The new 
model with the net profit ratio is specified as follows. 
                                                                                  
                                                                 
                 ,                                                                                (2) 
where                 is defined as lagged net income divided by total tangible fixed assets. 
We also compute two widely-used proxies for firm-level productivity. First, following 
McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) and Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), we calculate value 
added per worker,                            , which is defined as the lagged value of 
total sales less materials cost of goods sold, divided by the number of workers. Second, we 
construct the average labour productivity,                   , which is given by the lagged 
total real sales divided by the number of workers. Neither of these measures has the desirable 
theoretical properties of TFP, but they may have desirable statistical properties since they are 
not computed from a regression. The model with these two alternative efficiency measures is 
as follows: 
                                                                     
                                                                             
                                                            . (3) 
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       To test the robustness of the growth hypothesis, we include different measures of growth. 
The first is the growth rate of value added (                        ). We are also 
interested in various sources of output growth, i.e., the rate of factor accumulation (proxied 
by the growth rates of total assets,                  , and of employment, 
                      ), and the rate of improvement in firm productivity (the growth 
rate of TFP,                ). The model with these alternative growth variables can be 
expressed as  follows: 
                                                                                 
                                                                             
                                                                  
                                             .                                                                                  (4) 
Lastly, we include the exports to sales ratio as a control variable in the regression, in 
place of the dummy variable indicating whether or not the firm exports. This leads to the 
following model: 
                                                                                 
                                                     
                                     ,                                             (5) 
where                   is the lagged ratio of exports to total real sales. 
We present summary statistics of these new variables in Table 4. The net profit ratio 
is lowest for SOEs (5.9%), whereas for all non-state sectors, it is above 24%. There is a sharp 
contrast in profitability between the state and non-state firms. SOEs have the lowest 
efficiency as measured by value added per worker and average labour productivity, and 
private and foreign firms are the most efficient. SOEs also have the lowest rates of all four 
growth measures, i.e., value added growth (3.6%), total asset growth (1.7%), employment 
growth (-4.1%), and TFP growth (4.4%). On the other hand, private firms have the highest 
growth rates of value added (12.6%), total assets (10.6%), and  TFP (9.8%). Foreign firms 
have the highest growth in employment (4.9%). SOEs have the lowest exports to sales ratio 
(4.5%), while foreign firms have the highest (49.5%). The ratios for collective firms and 
private firms are in between. In brief, these statistics confirm our previous findings that SOEs 
are the worst performers in terms of profitability, efficiency, growth and exports, whereas 
private and foreign firms are the best performers. 
Table 5 reports the probit estimation results for the models including these new 
variables. Net profit displays a very similar pattern to that of cash flow: the probability of 
divestment declines as internal finance becomes abundant and the marginal effect is greatest 
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for SOEs. The presence of the profit ratio variable does not change the features of the 
leverage term (not reported): excess leverage in the state sector still worsens firms’ 
performance and increases the probability of negative investment, whereas, for private firms, 
limited access to external finance creates incentives for divestment.  
The coefficient on value added per worker is significantly negative for SOEs, 
insignificant for collective firms, and significantly positive for private and foreign firms. This 
indicates, more clearly than in the baseline model that the efficiency explanation of negative 
investment holds only for the state sector: for SOEs, a one standard deviation decrease in 
value added per worker is associated with an increase in the probability of divestment by 2.3 
percentage points. For private and foreign firms, the probability of negative investment 
increases as efficiency improves, implying that it is not because they are inefficient that they 
divest. The use of average labour productivity tells the same story, except that collective 
firms also have a significantly positive coefficient. Thus these robustness tests not only 
confirm that the efficiency explanation applies to SOEs but also provide evidence that it does 
not apply to non-state firms. 
Growth of value added and TFP do not affect the divestment decisions of state and 
collective firms but reduce the probability of divestment by private and foreign firms. In the 
case of real asset growth and employment growth, the coefficient is significantly negative for 
all firms. Although there are minor differences according to the measure being used, our main 
finding of the growth explanation is robust: growth generally reduces the chances of negative 
investment, but tends to do so more for private and foreign firms than for state and collective 
firms.  
We find that the baseline results for the control variables are robust when alternative 
measures are used. Moreover, our results also hold when we use the 100% rule to classify 
ownership groups and when the tobit estimation method is employed. To save space we do 
not report these results. 
7.2 Instrumental variable methods  
Our method of lagging the right-hand-side variables once might not be sufficient to alleviate 
potential endogeneity. As a further robustness test, we therefore use the instrumental variable 
(IV) method to test our baseline model specification. We instrument all financing, efficiency, 
growth and firm size variables using their own values lagged twice. Both random-effects 
probit and tobit IV models are estimated. To save space, we only report the results of the 
probit estimation in Table 6. 
22 
 
The results relative to the variables representing our three hypotheses are generally 
consistent with those of our baseline model. One minor difference lies in the control variables 
of firm age and size. After being instrumented, the coefficient of firm size becomes 
significantly positive only for private firms, suggesting that firm size is not important in 
determining the divestment decisions of the other types of firms. A similar story holds for 
firm age, which is significant and positive only for private and foreign firms (a one standard 
deviation increase in firm age is associated with an increase in the probability of divestment 
by 7.3 and 13.8 percentage points for private and foreign firms respectively). These results 
strengthen our argument that the easy access of SOEs to external finance makes size and age 
irrelevant to their divestment decisions. Only in the private and foreign categories are 
younger and smaller firms more likely to outperform their counterparts, and therefore less 
likely to divest. In brief, the instrumental variable results provide evidence that the baseline 
model findings are robust. 
7.3 Interaction terms 
This section aims at testing the possibility that the response of negative investment to changes 
in certain variables may be non-linear. For instance, we found that in the baseline model, the 
relationship between cash flow and divestment is negative for all firms. A follow-up question 
is whether the impact is the same between firms with abundant cash flow and firms with 
scarce cash flow. We test for this hypothesis by estimating the following model: 
   
                                                                           
                                                                                                        
                                                                                                       ,   (6) 
 
where            (           ) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i’s cash flow at 
time t-1 is in the bottom (top) half of the distribution of the cash flow of all firm-year 
observations in that same year, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, we compute interaction terms for 
leverage, collateral, TFP, and sales growth to examine the differential effects of these 
variables on the divestment decisions of firms with low/high leverage, low/high collateral, 
low/high TFP, and low/high sales growth, respectively. 
Table 7 reports the probit estimation results of the models which include these 
interactions terms. To save space, we report only the results of the new interactions terms and 
a    test for the equality of the coefficients between each group of firms. We find that the 
impact of cash flow on negative investment is greater for firms with lower cash flow, and the 
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difference between low and high cash flow groups is significant for SOEs, collective and 
private firms. Within these ownership groups, ceteris paribus, the sensitivity of the 
probability of divestment to changes in cash flow is higher for firms with lower cash flow. 
This can be explained considering that for firms with abundant cash flow, the latter typically 
carries a low marginal valuation: further adding to it does not therefore affect firm behaviour 
too much. 
A significant difference between lower and higher leverage groups is found only for 
private firms. For these, an increase in leverage is associated with a drop in the probability of 
negative investment, the effect being greater for firms with lower external borrowing. Once 
again this can be explained considering that for firms with high leverage, leverage has a low 
marginal valuation: adding to it has consequently moderate effects. On the contrary, the 
coefficient on leverage is positive and significant for SOEs with higher leverage ratio: the 
adverse impact of soft budget constraint is, understandably, more severe for the state firms 
with high leverage.  
The differential effect of asset tangibility on divestment between low and high 
collateral groups is significant for all firms. For each ownership group, low asset tangibility is 
associated with a low probability of negative investment, the effect being greater for firms 
with a lower collateral ratio. 
TFP displays an interesting pattern between low and high TFP groups. For SOEs and 
collective firms, the coefficient is negative and significant for firms with high TFP. State and 
collective firms divest for efficiency reasons, and this is particularly true for firms with 
relatively high TFP. In contrast, among private and foreign firms, the coefficient of TFP is 
significantly positive for firms in the low TFP group, i.e., private and foreign firms with low 
TFP do not divest for efficiency purpose, while private and foreign firms with high TFP do.      
Lastly, for all ownership groups, the impact of sales growth on divestment is greater 
for firms with high growth rates. Growth reduces the chances of negative investment, and this 
is particularly the case for firms with high growth rates. This result helps to explain why 
divestment is more sensitive to growth for foreign and private firms: these are the faster 
growing ownership sectors.  
In summary, all these robustness tests provide further support for our findings in the 
baseline model. 
8. Conclusions 
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To the best of our knowledge, this paper represents a first attempt to investigate firms’ 
divestment behaviour in China. The issue is of particular interest because it presents a puzzle. 
China is an international outlier on account of its high rate of industrial investment, but it is 
also characterized by a high frequency of negative net investment in its industrial sector. We 
have tried to explain this puzzle using a large and comprehensive panel data set of industrial 
firms over the period 2000-07. 
Our descriptive statistics show dramatic structural changes over the decade, with the 
share of the state sector declining and that of the non-state sector expanding. Despite their 
gradual reform, SOEs remain the poor performers of the economy: they have the highest 
divestment rate, lowest profitability, lowest efficiency, slowest growth rate, and the highest 
leverage rate. This suggests that the state sector has been cushioned by favourable access to 
credit and state subsidies. In contrast, the private and foreign sectors, which contain the most 
efficient, profitable, and fast-growing firms, have less access to the formal financial system. 
Collective firms exhibit good financial performance and improvements in productivity, but 
their growth prospects are not comparable to those of private and foreign firms.  
Given this huge heterogeneity in firms owned by different agents, our study of 
divestment in China required separate analysis of the different ownership groups. We tested 
whether firms owned by different agents divest for different reasons. The results from both 
our probit and tobit regressions support the hypothesis that the negative investment by SOEs 
can be explained largely by inefficiency, whereas private and foreign firms divest in order to 
raise capital. Rapid economic growth counterweighs both effects, especially in the private 
and foreign sectors, which are the most dynamic. Robustness tests using additional proxies, 
instrumental variables, and interactions terms support these findings. 
Our findings have policy implications. For instance, the limited access to external 
finance of the non-state sector is the most likely source of negative investment for private 
firms. This suggests the need for further reform of the financial system, which has lagged 
behind most other economic reforms in China.  
Our study suffers from a number of limitations. The dataset does not allow us to 
observe the exact timing and amount of asset sales or divestment by firms, making 
interpretations difficult. The extent to which our findings can be generalized to all sectors of 
the Chinese economy may also be questioned, due to the fact that only manufacturing and 
mining enterprises are covered in the NBS dataset. In order to test whether our findings can 
be generalized, future research should be extended to less mature, faster growing sectors of 
the economy such as the dynamic service sector, which has fuelled China’s economic growth 
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over the last few years. Finally, the lack of segment-level data makes it impossible to test 
other hypotheses of divestment such as the focus explanation and liquidity explanation, 
which may be important in determining firms’ divestment behaviour. 
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 Table 1. Descriptive statistics of key variables 
 
 Full 
sample 
SOEs Collective 
firms 
Private 
firms 
Foreign 
firms 
 
Investment vs divestment 
 
fixed investment/tangible fixed assets  0.095 
(0.072) 
0.042 
(0.021) 
0.072 
(0.056) 
0.107 
(0.087) 
0.099 
(0.070) 
negative investment ratio 0.314 
(0.000) 
0.407 
(0.000) 
0.343 
(0.000) 
0.303 
(0.000) 
 
0.291 
(0.000) 
Independent variables in the baseline model 
 
cash flow 0.348 
(0.194) 
0.141 
(0.072) 
0.415 
(0.216) 
0.353 
(0.200) 
0.392 
(0.225) 
leverage 0.578 
(0.592) 
0.632 
(0.643) 
0.592 
(0.605) 
0.597 
(0.615) 
0.485 
(0.482) 
collateral 0.341 
(0.315) 
0.415 
(0.400) 
0.330 
(0.295) 
0.339 
(0.313) 
0.323 
(0.301) 
TFP 3.340 
(2.259) 
2.893 
(1.768) 
2.996 
(2.088) 
3.129 
(2.143) 
4.644 
(3.019) 
sales growth 0.116 
(0.108) 
0.060 
(0.060) 
0.083 
(0.081) 
0.131 
(0.121) 
0.112 
(0.104) 
firm size 5.485 
(5.301) 
6.057 
(5.980) 
5.174 
(5.084) 
5.286 
(5.102) 
6.010  
(5.889) 
firm age 2.114 
(2.079) 
3.070 
(3.401) 
2.589 
(2.639) 
1.960 
(1.946) 
1.988 
(2.079) 
export 0.339 
(0.000) 
0.181 
(0.000) 
0.144   
(0.000) 
0.276 
(0.000) 
0.715 
(1.000) 
      
Observations 639,361 48,689 52,427 399,072 113,469 
 
Notes: mean and median (in parentheses) values of each variable are reported. The ownership classification is based on the 
majority rule. All variables are defined in Table A3 in Appendix 1. 
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Table 2. Baseline model -- random-effects probit estimation 
 
 SOEs Collective 
firms 
Private 
firms 
Foreign 
firms 
                -0.221** 
(0.050) 
[-0.079] 
-0.156** 
(0.026) 
[-0.055] 
-0.114** 
(0.012) 
[-0.038] 
-0.081** 
(0.015) 
[-0.026] 
               0.145** 
(0.046) 
[0.052] 
-0.023 
(0.046) 
-0.175** 
(0.017) 
[-0.058] 
0.037 
(0.028) 
 
                 0.931** 
(0.062) 
[0.335] 
0.773** 
(0.063) 
[0.271] 
0.890** 
(0.023) 
[0.299] 
0.765** 
(0.042) 
[0.249] 
          -0.057** 
(0.006) 
[-0.020] 
-0.039** 
(0.006) 
[-0.014] 
-0.032** 
(0.002) 
[-0.011] 
-0.019** 
(0.002) 
[-0.006] 
                   -0.188** 
(0.027) 
[-0.067] 
-0.202** 
(0.028) 
[-0.070] 
-0.267** 
(0.009) 
[-0.089] 
-0.307** 
(0.016) 
[-0.100] 
                -0.012 
(0.010) 
 
0.026** 
(0.012) 
[0.009] 
0.012** 
(0.004) 
[0.003] 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
             0.027** 
(0.014) 
[0.010] 
0.032* 
(0.017) 
[0.011] 
0.088** 
(0.006) 
[0.029] 
0.171** 
(0.016) 
[0.055] 
           -0.007 
(0.030) 
-0.038 
(0.029) 
-0.123** 
(0.009) 
[-0.041] 
-0.155** 
(0.014) 
[-0.051] 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.080 0.054 0.047 0.056 
Observations 19,264 21,139 157,606 61,229 
 
Note: the dependent variable is a binary variable which takes  value of one if the firm 
divests, and zero otherwise. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ** and * indicate significance at the 5 and 10 percent level respectively. 
Marginal effects are in square brackets for those variables that are statistically 
significant. Time dummies, industry dummies and their interactions are included in 
estimation but not reported. The ownership classification is based on the majority rule. 
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Table 3. Baseline model -- random-effects tobit estimation 
 
 SOEs Collective 
firms 
Private 
firms 
Foreign 
firms 
                -0.082** 
(0.018) 
[-0.082] 
-0.099** 
(0.014) 
[-0.099] 
-0.065** 
(0.006) 
[-0.065] 
-0.043** 
(0.008) 
[-0.043] 
               0.016 
(0.017) 
-0.068** 
(0.025) 
[-0.068] 
-0.126** 
(0.010) 
[-0.126] 
0.013 
(0.015) 
                 0.294** 
(0.026) 
[0.294] 
0.450** 
(0.038) 
[0.450] 
0.574** 
(0.015) 
[0.574] 
0.481** 
(0.026) 
[0.481] 
          -0.019** 
(0.002) 
[-0.019] 
-0.018** 
(0.004) 
[-0.018] 
-0.017** 
(0.001) 
[-0.017] 
-0.010** 
(0.001) 
[-0.010] 
                   -0.044** 
(0.010) 
[-0.044] 
-0.064** 
(0.017) 
[-0.064] 
-0.118** 
(0.007) 
[-0.118] 
-0.136** 
(0.011) 
[-0.136] 
                -0.003 
(0.004) 
0.016** 
(0.007) 
[0.016] 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
[0.008] 
-0.015** 
(0.003) 
[-0.015] 
             0.003 
(0.005) 
0.013 
(0.009) 
0.044** 
(0.003) 
[0.044] 
0.104** 
(0.009) 
[0.104] 
           0.007 
(0.012) 
-0.005 
(0.018) 
-0.061** 
(0.005) 
[-0.061] 
-0.079** 
(0.008) 
[-0.079] 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.054 0.038 0.035 0.044 
Observations 19,264 21,139 157,606 61,229 
 
Note: the dependent variable is a censored variable which is equal to zero if the firm 
does not divest, and takes the value of the actual amount of divestment otherwise. Also 
see Notes to Table 2. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics of variables used in the robustness tests 
 
 Full sample SOEs Collective 
firms 
Private 
firms 
Foreign 
firms 
 
Financing variable 
 
     
profit 0.234 
(0.082) 
0.059 
(0.009) 
0.299 
(0.101) 
0.242 
(0.092) 
0.251 
(0.090) 
Efficiency variables 
 
     
value added per worker 0.701 
(0.408) 
0.470 
(0.231) 
0.629 
(0.357) 
0.696 
(0.428) 
0.839 
(0.442) 
productivity 2.669 
(1.684) 
1.549 
(0.814) 
2.364 
(1.438) 
2.657 
(1.740) 
3.291 
(2.040) 
 
Growth variables 
 
     
value added growth 0.111 
(0.098) 
0.036 
(0.043) 
0.062 
(0.058) 
0.126 
(0.110) 
0.121 
(0.104) 
asset growth 0.086 
(0.046) 
0.017 
(-0.001) 
0.051 
(0.018) 
0.106 
(0.063) 
0.075 
(0.047) 
employment growth 0.017 
(0.000) 
-0.041 
(-0.013) 
-0.011 
(0.000) 
0.021 
(0.000) 
0.049 
(0.008) 
TFP growth 0.090 
(0.080) 
0.044 
(0.046) 
0.060 
(0.059) 
0.098 
(0.087) 
0.097 
(0.085) 
 
Conditioning variable 
 
     
export ratio 0.196 
(0.000) 
0.045 
(0.000) 
0.068 
(0.000) 
0.147 
(0.000) 
0.495 
(0.519) 
      
Observations 639,361 48,689 52,427 399,072 113,469 
 
Note: See Notes to Table 1. 
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Table 5. Robustness tests – alternative measures of hypotheses (random-effects probit 
estimation) 
 
 SOEs Collective 
firms 
Private firms Foreign 
firms 
 
Financing variable (Model 2) 
             -0.190** 
(0.051) 
[-0.069] 
-0.109** 
(0.026) 
[-0.038] 
-0.071** 
(0.011) 
[-0.024] 
-0.057** 
(0.015) 
[-0.018] 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.079 0.054 0.047 0.056 
Observations 19,264 21,139 157,606 61,229 
 
Efficiency variables (Model 3) 
                            -0.065** 
(0.017) 
[-0.023] 
-0.003 
(0.015) 
 
0.018** 
(0.004) 
[0.006] 
0.017** 
(0.006) 
[0.005] 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.085 0.053 0.047 0.057 
Observations 
 
23,739 21,709 163,095 65,815 
                   -0.015** 
(0.006) 
[-0.005] 
0.008* (0.005) 
[0.003] 
0.013** 
(0.002) 
[0.004] 
0.017** 
(0.002) 
[0.006] 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.085 0.053 0.046 0.058 
Observations 23,739 21,709 163,095 65,815 
 
Growth variables (Model 4) 
                         -0.001 
(0.016) 
 
-0.022 
(0.019) 
 
-0.101** 
(0.007) 
[-0.034] 
-0.082** 
(0.010) 
[-0.027] 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.081 0.053 0.044 0.052 
Observations 
 
16,468 18,968 148,823 55,385 
                   -0.457** 
(0.050) 
[-0.164] 
-0.171** 
(0.040) 
[-0.059] 
-0.318** 
(0.013) 
[-0.107] 
-0.268** 
(0.022) 
[-0.087] 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.082 0.053 0.047 0.054 
Observations 
 
19,277 21,142 157,632 61,220 
                        -0.209** 
(0.042) 
[-0.076] 
-0.272** 
(0.037) 
[-0.095] 
-0.322** 
(0.012) 
[-0.107] 
-0.396** 
(0.021) 
[-0.129] 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.079 0.054 0.047 0.057 
Observations 
 
19,246 21,127 157,550 61,183 
                 0.005 
(0.019) 
-0.009 (0.020) -0.068** 
(0.007) 
[-0.023] 
-0.050** 
(0.010) 
[-0.017] 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.081 0.053 0.043 0.051 
Observations 15,500 18,186 142,208 51,665 
 
Conditioning variable (Model 5) 
                   0.067 
(0.065) 
-0.016 (0.046) -0.139** 
(0.013) 
[-0.047] 
-0.153** 
(0.015) 
[-.049] 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.080 0.054 0.047 0.056 
Observations 19,264 21,139 157,606 61,229 
 
Notes: For each model, we only report the results of the new variable to save space. Also se Notes to 
Table 2. 
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Table 6. Robustness tests – instrumental variable method (random-effects probit 
estimation) 
 
 SOEs Collective 
firms 
Private 
firms 
Foreign 
firms 
                -0.344** 
(0.117) 
[-0.344] 
-0.183** 
(0.062) 
[-0.183] 
-0.147** 
(0.035) 
[-0.147] 
-0.135** 
(0.048) 
[-0.135] 
               0.222** 
(0.061) 
[0.222] 
-0.026 
(0.062) 
-0.214** 
(0.025) 
[-0.214] 
0.052 
(0.038) 
                 0.806** 
(0.091) 
[0.806] 
0.622** 
(0.086) 
[0.622] 
0.604** 
(0.039) 
[0.604] 
0.536** 
(0.075) 
[0.536] 
          -0.073** 
(0.008) 
[-0.073] 
-0.048** 
(0.010) 
[-0.048] 
-0.038** 
(0.004) 
[-0.038] 
-0.020** 
(0.004) 
[-0.020] 
                   -0.201** 
(0.038) 
[-0.201] 
-0.193** 
(0.034) 
[-0.193] 
-0.276** 
(0.012) 
[-0.276] 
-0.324** 
(0.022) 
[-0.324] 
                0.012 
(0.014) 
0.029 
(0.018) 
0.025** 
(0.007) 
[0.025] 
-0.005 
(0.011) 
             0.014 
(0.017) 
 
0.016 
(0.019) 
0.073** 
(0.006) 
[0.073] 
0.138** 
(0.019) 
[0.138] 
           -0.033 
(0.034) 
0.005 
(0.032) 
-0.131** 
(0.009) 
[-0.131] 
-0.155** 
(0.015) 
[-0.155] 
Wald test of exogeneity 89.67 
{0.000} 
25.80 
{0.000} 
357.96 
{0.000} 
67.02 
{0.000} 
Observations 12,483 14,654 112,695 42,614 
 
Notes: p values of the Wald test of exogeneity are shown in curly brackets. Also see Notes to Table 2. 
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Table 7. Robustness tests – interactions (probit estimation) 
 SOEs Collective firms Private firms Foreign firms 
 
cash flow 
 
    
                           -0.425** 
(0.083) 
[-0.153] 
-0.348** 
(0.078) 
[-0.122] 
-0.485** 
(0.035) 
[-0.162] 
-0.111** 
(0.029) 
[-0.036] 
                            -0.173** 
(0.052) 
[-0.062] 
-0.149** 
(0.026) 
[-0.052] 
-0.095** 
(0.011) 
[-0.032] 
-0.077** 
(0.015) 
[-0.025] 
   test for           8.51 
{0.003} 
7.47 
{0.006} 
137.77 
{0.000} 
1.37 
{0.242} 
 
leverage 
 
    
                                0.045 
(0.078) 
-0.068 
(0.070) 
-0.255** 
(0.025) 
[-0.085] 
-0.029 
(0.038) 
                                 0.116** 
(0.049) 
[0.042] 
-0.034 
(0.047) 
-0.193** 
(0.017) 
[-0.065] 
0.032 
(0.028) 
   test for           2.43 
{0.118} 
0.69 
{0.405} 
17.69 
{0.000} 
5.95 
{0.014} 
 
collateral 
 
   
 
 
                                    3.461** 
(0.136) 
[1.219] 
3.095** 
(0.121) 
[1.057] 
3.346** 
(0.042) 
[1.086] 
2.887** 
(0.070) 
[0.919] 
                                     1.541** 
(0.070) 
[0.543] 
1.222** 
(0.068) 
[0.417] 
1.374** 
(0.025) 
[0.446] 
1.207** 
(0.044) 
[0.384] 
   test for           449.51 
{0.000} 
518.54 
{0.000} 
5089.08 
{0.000} 
1418.81 
{0.000} 
 
TFP 
 
    
                      0.015 
(0.010) 
0.013 
(0.011) 
0.027** 
(0.004) 
[0.009] 
0.058** 
(0.005) 
[0.019] 
                       -0.045** 
(0.005) 
[-0.016] 
-0.038** 
(0.006) 
[-0.013] 
-0.028** 
(0.002) 
[-0.009] 
-0.015** 
(0.002) 
[-0.004] 
   test for           45.15 
{0.000} 
32.95 
{0.000} 
259.86 
{0.000} 
201.31 
{0.000} 
 
sales growth 
 
    
                                      -0.129** 
(0.036) 
[-0.046] 
-0.124** 
(0.038) 
[-0.043] 
-0.109** 
(0.013) 
[-0.036] 
-0.176** 
(0.022) 
[-0.057] 
                                       -0.259** 
(0.040) 
[-0.093] 
-0.279** 
(0.038) 
[-0.097] 
-0.403** 
(0.012) 
[-0.135] 
-0.434** 
(0.022) 
[-0.141] 
   test for           5.80 
{0.016} 
8.75 
{0.003} 
271.02 
{0.000} 
72.48 
{0.000} 
 
Observations 
 
19,264 
 
21,139 
 
157,606 
 
61,229 
 
Notes: LOW(X)i,t  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i’s variable X at time t is in the bottom half of the distribution 
of that variable, and 0 otherwise. HIGH(X)i,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i’s variable X at time t is in the top 
half of the distribution of that variable, and 0 otherwise. For each model, we only report the coefficients associated 
with the new variables to save space. p values of the    test for the hypothesis that the coefficients of the two 
variables are the same are in curly brackets. Also see Notes to Table 2. 
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Figure 1. Share of firms owned by different agents in total investment in fixed assets 
 
Data source: NBS Statistical Yearbook (Various issues). Notes: individual firms include 
family farms and small private businesses; other types of ownership consist of joint-
ownership enterprises, shareholding companies, joint-venture enterprises, and foreign 
firms.  
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Appendix 1 
Table A1. Structure of our unbalanced panel 
Panel I 
 
Year Number of 
observations 
Percent Cumulative 
2000 49,639 7.76 7.76 
2001 66,241 10.36 18.12 
2002 78,640 12.30 30.42 
2003 93,330 14.60 45.02 
2004 92,291 14.43 59.45 
2005 91,147 14.26 73.71 
2006 87,147 13.63 87.34 
2007 80,947 12.66 100.00 
Total 639,382 100.00  
 
 
Panel II 
  
Number of obs. 
per firm 
Number of 
observations 
Percent Cumulative 
5 154,645 24.19 24.19 
6 140,316 21.95 46.13 
7 153,685 24.04 70.17 
8 190,736 29.83 100.00 
Total 639,382 100.00  
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Table A2. Distribution of observations by ownership  
Panel I. By the majority rule 
 
 SOEs Collective 
firms 
Private 
firms 
Foreign 
firms 
Mixed 
ownership 
Total 
2000 11.80 11.06 52.04 19.49 5.61 100.00 
2001 9.49 9.62 58.00 18.20 4.69 100.00 
2002 8.65 8.90 60.89 17.23 4.33 100.00 
2003 7.57 8.04 63.36 17.25 3.77 100.00 
2004 7.36 7.83 63.56 17.53 3.71 100.00 
2005 6.75 7.62 64.42 17.47 3.73 100.00 
2006 6.27 7.21 65.18 17.69 3.65 100.00 
2007 5.28 6.93 66.25 17.99   3.55 100.00 
Average 7.62 8.20 62.42 17.75 4.02 100.00 
 
Note: all numbers in this table are in percentage terms.    
 
 
Panel II. By the 100% rule 
 
 SOEs Collective 
firms 
Private 
firms 
Foreign 
firms 
Mixed 
ownership 
Total 
2000 5.89 3.58 23.53 10.54 56.45 100.00 
2001 4.75 3.13 31.18 10.04 50.90 100.00 
2002 4.27 2.96 35.43 9.62 47.73 100.00 
2003 3.71 2.71 39.57 9.96 44.05 100.00 
2004 3.68 2.69 40.00 10.21 43.41 100.00 
2005 3.25 2.57 40.52 10.21 43.45 100.00 
2006 2.95 2.40 41.14 10.39 43.13 100.00 
2007 2.23 2.27 42.04 10.62 42.85 100.00 
Average 3.69 2.73 37.67 10.18 45.72 100.00 
 
Note: all numbers in this table are in percentage terms.    
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Table A3. Variable definitions 
Variables Definitions 
 
Dependent variable in the probit model 
 
divestment 
 
Binary variable which takes value of one if the firm divests (ik<0), and zero 
otherwise. ik is the ratio of fixed investment to tangible fixed assets, where fixed 
investment is defined as the difference between the book value of tangible fixed 
assets of end of year t and end of year t-1, adding depreciation of year t. 
 
Dependent variable in the tobit model 
 
divestment 
 
Censored variable equal to zero if the firm does not divest (ik>=0), and equal to the 
actual value of the divestment otherwise. 
 
Independent variables (in both the baseline model and robustness tests) 
 
Financing variables 
 
 
cash flow 
 
Cash flow divided by total tangible fixed assets. Cash flow is defined as the sum of 
the firm's net income and depreciation. 
leverage Total debt divided by total assets. 
collateral Tangible fixed assets divided by total assets. 
profit Net income divided by total tangible fixed asset. 
 
Efficiency variables 
 
 
TFP 
 
Total factor productivity calculated using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method. 
value added per worker Real value added divided by the number of employees. 
productivity Average labour productivity: real sales divided by the number of employees. 
 
Growth variables 
 
 
sales growth 
 
Growth rate of real sales 
value added growth Growth rate of value added 
asset growth Growth rate of total real assets 
employment growth Growth rate of number of employees 
TFP growth Growth rate of TFP 
 
Conditioning variables 
 
 
 
firm size 
 
Natural logarithm of the book value of total real assets. 
firm age Natural logarithm of firm age  
export  Dummy variable  equal to one if the firm exports, and zero otherwise. 
export ratio Ratio of exports over total real sales. 
 
Note: all variables (except dummy variables) are deflated using provincial ex-factory producer price indices taken from 
various issues of the China Statistical Yearbook. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Procedure to construct TFP 
A key issue in the estimation of production functions is the correlation between unobservable 
productivity shocks and input levels (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). Profit-maximizing firms 
respond to positive productivity shocks by expanding output, which requires additional inputs. 
Negative shocks lead firms to pare back output, decreasing their input usage. Methods that 
ignore this endogeneity, such as OLS and the fixed-effects estimator, will provide 
inconsistent estimates of the parameters of the production function. In this paper, we follow 
the approach of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) which uses intermediate inputs as a proxy for 
unobservable shocks. 
We assume a simple two-factor production function of the form: 
          
 
   
 
                                                                 (A1) 
where     is a measure of output such as gross revenue or value added, and     and     
represent the usage of labour and capital, respectively.     is total factor productivity (TFP) 
which increases all factors’ marginal products simultaneously. Transforming equation (A1) 
into logarithms allows linear estimation. Henceforth small letters will be used for logs. A 
simple standard estimation equation of the production function then looks as follows: 
                                                                                                    (A2) 
The residual of this equation is the logarithm of plant-specific TFP, namely    .The 
simultaneity problem is that at least a part of TFP will be observed by the firm at a point in 
time early enough so as to allow the firm to change the factor input decision. For any profit-
maximizing firm, the realization of the error term of the production function is expected to 
influence the choice of factor inputs. To deal with the correlation between the regressors and 
the error term, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimate the following production function 
                                                        (A3) 
where     is the logarithm of the firm’s output;     and     are the logarithm of the freely 
variable labour and intermediate inputs; and     is the logarithm of the state variable capital. 
The error term has two components: the transmitted productivity component given by    , 
and an independent and identically-distributed component, which is uncorrelated with input 
choice,    . The key difference between     and     is that the former is a state variable and 
hence impacts the firm’s decision rules, while the latter has no impact on the firm’s decisions. 
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Demand for the intermediate input     is assumed to depend on the firm’s state 
variables     and    :                 . Making mild assumptions about the firm’s 
production technology, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) show that this demand function is 
monotonically increasing in    . This allows the inversion of the intermediate demand 
function, which leads to:                  . The unobservable productivity term is now 
expressed solely as a function of two observed inputs. Besides,  Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
assume that productivity is governed by a first-order Markov process, i.e. 
                     , where     is an innovation to productivity that is uncorrelated with 
   , but not necessarily with    . This is part of the source of the simultaneity problem. 
Equation (A3) can therefore be expressed as 
                                                                                                      (A4) 
where                                           . Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
approximate             by a third-order polynomial in   and  ,          
  
 
 
        
 , and 
obtain an estimate of    and   via OLS. This constitutes the first stage of their estimation 
procedure.  
In the second stage, the elasticity of capital    is defined as the solution to the 
following problem:               
        
          
 
  , where    is a nonparametric 
approximation of                Since the estimator involves two stages, the calculation of 
the covariance matrix of the parameters is quite involved. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
suggest therefore the use of a bootstrapping procedure to estimate standard errors. Once 
consistent estimates of the input elasticities are derived, the log of productivity can be 
obtained as                        . TFP estimates based on the Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) method can be obtained in STATA by using the levpet command. 
 
